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ARGUMENT
I.

DEFENDANT/APPELLANT DID JOIN IN THE MOTION FOR
CONTINUANCE WITH CO-DEFENDANT.
Plaintiff/Appellee claims that Defendant Carter failed

to join in Ellis' Motion For Continuance.

Although, the

record does not specifically state that Defendant Carter
joined in the Motion for Continuance, his counsel had in
fact informed the court that Defendant Carter was joining in
said motion.

The Judge obviously understood this, as is

reflected by the record when he asked Defendant Carter's
counsel if he had anything to add.

(Supp. Tr. Page 4 line

5-6) .
The Plaintiff/Appellee states that the only indication
that the Defendant/Appellant intended to enter into the
Motion For Continuance was his ambiguous statement, "I don't
have anything to add, your honor".
ambiguous statement.

This was not an

It clearly states that Defendant

Carter's counsel did not have any further argument to add to
Defendant Ellis' qounsel's arguments in support of the

1

Motion to continue the trial.

Also, by asking Defendant

Carter's counsel if he had anything to add, the Judge
clearly expressed his intention to include Defendant Carter
in the Motion.
If Defendant/Appellant had no interest in entering into
the motion for continuance he would have clearly stated for
the record that Defendant/Appellant was not interested in a
continuance and wished to proceed with trial.
was not the case.

However, this

In fact, prior to the commencement of the

trial, the State pointed out to the Court that Defendant
Ellis' testimony was important to Defendant Carter's
defense.

If Defendant Ellis were to receive a continuance

and Defendant Carter were to proceed to trial, Defendant
Carter, of course would not have the benefit of Defendant
Ellis' testimony.

Defendant Carter's counsel informed the

Court that he believed it would be prejudicial to Defendant
Carter if Defendant Ellis were not tried at the same time.
(Hearing Tr. Page 4, line 3-9) It simply would not make
sense for Defendant Carter to not join in the Motion To

2

Continue and face the possibility of a trial without
Defendant Ellis.
The State insisted on the Defendant's being tried
together (Hearing Tr. Page 4, Line 12-15).

If Defendant

Carter was not joining in said motion and endeavoring to
proceed to trial without Defendant Ellis, the State surely
would have objected.

There was no such objection.

Plaintiff/Appellee contends that Defendant Carter and
Defendant Ellis appeared to have incompatible interests
because Ellis was represented by a court-appointed 'attorney
from the Legal Defender's Association and Defendant Carter
was represented by court-appointed conflict counsel.

This

is pure speculation and not supported by any record.

When a

case has more than one Defendant charged by the State, the
Legal Defenders Association has a policy of referring the
co-defendants to conflict counsel.

There were no

incompatible interest between the co-defendants and the
record as a whole reflects that their defenses were
consistent with each other.

3

Based upon Plaintiff/Appellee's mistaken assumption that
the interests of the co-defendants varied,
Plaintiff/Appellee argues that it was neither logical nor
ethically proper for the Defendant to rely upon a codefendant' s pretrial motions.

It is well established law

that when two defendants are charged with the same crime,
they can be tried together.

In fact, in this case, the

Judge ruled that Defendant Carter and Defendant Ellis were
to be tried together. (Hearing at page 12 line 11) Thus, the
mere fact that the Legal Defender's Association referred
Defendant Carter to conflict counsel does not mean that the
co-defendants interests were adverse.
II. EVIDENCE AND TESTIMONY OF BRIAN MEEK WAS MATERIAL AND
RELEVANT TO THE DEFENDANT/APPELLANT' S CASE.
Plaintiff/Appellee contends that the Defendant/Appellant
has failed to demonstrate that the absent witness' testimony
was both admissible and material to the Defendant's case.
The issue ar trial was whether or not Mr. Irvin had given
money to the Defendant/Appellant to buy drugs or whether the
money was stolen. Defendant/Appellant motioned the court for
4

a continuance based upon the newly discovered witness, in
order to investigate whether or not the witness' testimony
that Joshua Irvin was a drug user and buyer was credible or
could lead to other admissible credible testimony.

If the

testimony, that the newly discovered witness could have
offered, was credible, then it would have been material to
the Defendant/Appellant's case.

It would have been

introduced as evidence that Mr. Irvin was a drug user and
that he approached the Defendant/Appellant for the purpose
of buying drugs.

Furthermore, the victim, Joshua Irvin,

testified that he neither used or bought marijuana. (Trans,
at 25 line 14-24) If is were established that Mr. Meek's
testimony were credible and/or lead to other credible
evidence,

Defendant/Appellant would have recalled Mr. Irvin

and asked him if he used any illegal drugs.

If he answered

"No", Defendant/Appellant would have introduced Mr. Meek's
testimony under Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 613 for
purposes of impeachment.
Plaintiff/Appellee also contends that the

5

Defendant/Appellant failed to investigate
Defendant/Appellant's account of the events and/or failed to
investigate any potential witness who might corroborate
Defendant's story. Again, Plaintiff/Appellee is engaging in
rank speculation.

Defendant/Appellant did not fail to

investigate if Mr. Irvin was a drug user or whether he had
purchased drugs prior to this incident.

Defendant/Appellant

was not able to obtain any information of Mr. Irvin's drug
use prior to the trial.

It was only by pure chance that Mr.

Meek's testimony was discovered.

Mr. Irvin had no criminal

record of drug use and after diligent investigation no
evidence of drug use was found prior to the trial.
In addition, Plaintiff/Appellee indicates that Mr.
Meek's testimony would be hearsay as to the victim, Joshua
Irvin, owing his friend money for drugs.

Had a continuance

been granted, Defendant/Appellant could have investigated
and possibly procured the testimony of the friend to whom
Mr. Irvin allegedly owed money for drugs.
III.

DEFENDANT/APPELLANT WAS NOT ABLE TO ESTABLISH THAT
THERE WAS A WITNESS THAT COULD POSSIBLY CORROBORATE
6

THE DEFENDANT/APPELLANT'S VERSION OF EVENTS.
Defendant/Appellant was not aware of the witness, Brian
Meek, until court reconvened on the last day of trial. As
soon as counsel knew that Mr. Meek existed, due diligence
was used in ascertaining if he in fact knew Joshua Irvin and
had knowledge of Mr. Irvin's drug use.

However, since the

court denied the Motion For Continuance the matter could not
be pursued to determine if Mr. Meek would be a credible
witness and would help the Defendant/Appellant's case.
Plaintiff/Appellee contends that the Defendant/Appellant
could have requested permission to reopen the defense case
and could have recalled Joshua Irvin to the stand and asked
if he attended Cyprus High School to establish a nexus
between Meek and Irvin.

Plaintiff/Appellee states that in

the alternative, counsel could have requested a short recess
in order to call Mr. Meek to the stand to identify Joshua
Irvin.
To call Mr. Irvin to the stand to testify that he
attended Cyprus High School would have accomplished nothing.

7

Mr. Meek's testimony would have only been relevant and
material if it were used as evidence of

Mr. Irvin's prior

drug use and to impeach Mr. Irvin's prior testimony.
Furthermore, had counsel put Mr. Meek on the stand, absent
an investigation of Mr. Meek and the credibility of his
testimony, it would have been a classic case of ineffective
assistance of counsel.

Because Defendant/Appellant was not

aware of Mr. Meek's existence until the last day of trial,
Defendant/Appellant did not have a chance to investigate
whether Mr. Meek's testimony would help or hinder the
Defendant's case.

There was no opportunity to investigate

Mr. Meek's credibility since the Motion for Continuance was
denied.

Defendant was not afforded the opportunity to

pursue any investigation in this matter.
IV. DEFENDANT/APPELLANT DID USE DUE DILIGENCE IN
INVESTIGATING DEFENDANT'S ACCOUNT OF THE EVENTS.
Defendant/Appellant did not have time to establish and
investigate if Brian Meek's testimony would corroborate the
Defendant/Appellant's testimony because the trial was almost
over and the Court ruled against a Motion for Continuance.
8

In Salazar vs. State, 559 P.2d 66, (Alaska 1976), the court
ruled that denial of a one-day continuance to secure
testimony of absent police officer was denial of defendant's
constitutional rights to call favorable witnesses.

The

court found that the importance of the absent witnesses'
testimony was central to the defendant's case that denial of
the right to present this witness was a denial of his Sixth
Amendment Right.

In the Salazar case, the prosecution

presented evidence that the defendant's car could not be
seen from the road and the only way the defendant knew the
car was there was because he had committed the murder.
However, the absent witness would have testified that the
car could be seen from the road and would be key testimony
in the defendant's trial.

In the Defendant/Appellant's

case, the Plaintiff/Appellee presented evidence that the
victim, Joshua Irvin was not a drug user and did not
purchase drugs.

However, Defendant/Appellant's newly

discovered witnesses may have testified otherwise and given
credibility to the Defendant/Appellant's version of the

9

events that occurred.

Therefore, the court abused its

discretion in not granting a continuance in order to
investigate the testimony of Mr. Meeks.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the fore-going, the Defendant/Appellant
respectfully requests that the Court find that his rights
were violated and the Motion for Continuance should have
been granted.
DATED this £h

day of January, 1998.

i£

Wayne A. Freestone
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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